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Abstract 
In some sense, the period of scholarship we know as the 
Enlightenment, well-known for its individualistic, binaric and 
dichotomous theorising, could be largely to blame for the 
perceived schism between the humanities and the sciences – and, 
consequently, between humans and humans as well as between 
humans and the totality of their environment. My paper argues 
that, the philosophical and scientific achievements of the 
Enlightenment duly acknowledged (I have in mind here the 
positive central role that philosophical doubt plays in academic 
inquiry, for example), its destructive elements, epitomized by its 
dualistic, individualist, and, consequently, predatory subjectivity, 
have cast a long shadow on cordial human polity since the 17th 
Century. In short, strictly speaking, taken to its logical 
conclusion, the Enlightenment cannot yield us an ontology that 
would engender cordial relations among humans themselves or 
between humans and their environment. Post-Enlightenment (by 
which is meant post-Cartesian) ontological, epistemological and 
ethical postulations could redress the centuries-old disjunction 
(which characterises this shadow) between technological or 
intellectual development and amicable global living.  
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Introduction 
Pirelli, the tyre-making company, have a motto or an epithet that says: “Power 
is nothing without control.” What they most likely mean is that even the most 
powerful vehicle needs good tyres, with good and well-structured treading for 
sufficient traction, for it to be better driven, or to be driven at all and traction 
is what they, as Pirelli, provide. Power without control is indeed nothing and it 
may actually be worse than nothing, much worse in fact: it could be out-
rightly dangerous, reducing humanity to a Hobbesian scenario of “a war of all 
against all”. One of the central roles that the humanities have played since 
time immemorial is to set the ethical platform where matters of how one 
Subject could relate to another are thrashed out, precisely so that all the 
advancements in the other fields of inquiry can be enjoyed in harmony; so that 
we do not needlessly kill one another by using those advancements, or on 
account of them. Experience has shown that it is not enough to make 
astounding scientific discoveries; such discoveries require a viable ethical 
backcloth for them to be utilised meaningfully. So, we will see in this paper 
that, just as Rene Descartes had created a contrived dichotomy between mind 
and body, so, too, today do some continue to create a false dichotomy between 
the humanities and the sciences; the arts and the sciences together are like a 
well-greased or well-oiled axle. It should always be borne in mind as one 
reads this paper that in exploding the myth of the contrived Cartesian 
dichotomy this paper aims to explode the corresponding contrived dichotomy 
between the sciences and the humanities.  
The importance of the foregoing subject matter cannot be overemphasised and 
is underscored by the fact that scholarship has a long list of intellectuals who 
have, at one point or another, wrestled with matters of Self-Other relations; 
some have even made it their lifetime preoccupation. In this regard, ideas in 
this paper are followed from Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon (and, latterly, 
from the 19th Century, Social Darwinism) down to their nemeses such as the 
Frankfurters, among whom are Theodor Adorno and Jungen Habermas, and 
also the phenomenological theorizing of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and on to 





reviewers of the Enlightenment such as Charles Taylor and Patricia Waugh. I 
will then link these thinkers’ ideas to those on Self-Other relations as 
propounded by Julia Kristeva, W.E.B. Dubois, Franz Fanon, Albert Memmi, 
C.L.R. James, Paul Gilroy, Stewart Hall, Kwame Anthony Appiah, John Mbiti 
and Homi Bhabha. The paper also posits my own theoretical postulations that 
underpin what I have termed a post-binary self-other subjectivity, a 
philosophical system which comprises a post-Cartesian ontology, 
epistemology and ethics. The central tenets of this philosophical system 
revolve around the unitariness and relationalness or indebtednessness of 
subjectivity characterised by consciousness’s embodiedness, intentionality and 
inter-subjectivity. 
A sketch of the background to academic humanities 
It is commonly understood within philosophical circles that philosophy as a 
discipline of inquiry began as natural science, largely as cosmology, that is, as 
a study of the nature of the physical universe. According to the philosophers 
of the time, who are categorised as pre-Socratics, reality was divided into four 
main elements of existence, namely water, earth, fire and wind. But from the 
time of Socrates the focus of philosophy shifted from the natural world to an 
inquiry into the nature of the human being himself/herself both in terms of 
who s/he is in himself/herself as well as in relation to others – be they fellow 
human beings or other existents and qualities. This latter aspect constitutes 
what, broadly speaking, go by the names mores, morality or ethics.  We could 
say that when that shift in focus happened the humanities had formally entered 
the hard academy – and they had come to stay. But I must hasten to add that 
the humanities have to constantly be self-critical and innovative to remain 
valued members of the academy; and in Africa, especially since we are 
considered – rightly or wrongly – as latecomers to the feast of the formal 
academy, the humanities, just like the sciences, certainly don’t need African 
practitioners who are only spongers, folks who can only repeat every 
argument ever posited in the field. Rather, by tapping into indigenous 
knowledge systems we should strive to be thinkers and innovators in our own 
right, as well as in partnership with the rest of the world. Research into 
indigenous knowledge systems, therefore, is of paramount importance to the 






In this regard, to underscore the importance of familiarising ourselves with 
African indigenous knowledge systems, the main postulations in this paper 
would not have been arrived at if it were not for insights gained from African 
ontological orientations such as those adumbrated by John Mbiti (1975) which 
then act as a springboard. It would be far from true to suppose that indigenous 
knowledge systems have been wholly superseded and that there is nothing to 
be gained from going back to them. Of course, Colonial Globalisation would 
want it that way, but that would be going against the spirit of Progressive 
Globalisation – understood as Derridan post-Modernism or post-structuralism 
– which, ideally, should aim to look for local praxis and contributions to 
global polity. 
That said, I should point out that the practice of the mixing study of natural 
science and speculative philosophy can be seen in Aristotelian philosophising 
and scienticising and these two approaches to philosophy came together again 
even more definitively during the Enlightenment which mixed speculative 
philosophy with hard science, epitomised in the two giants of the movement, 
Descartes and Bacon, respectively. While all the main branches of philosophy 
have something to say about matters of reality and how it subsists, for 
purposes of convenience I will focus in this paper on only three branches, 
namely ontology, epistemology and ethics and show how these can play the 
role of grease or oil to the axle of our existence. 
When it came to inquiry into the nature of the human being and his or her 
relationship with his or her others as cited above, the ancient Greeks came up 
with what were known as the three elements of the soul and these were 
Reason, Good Emotions (such as courage, valour, chivalry) and Base 
Emotions (sex, food, etc.). Those that excelled in their use of the faculty of 
reason were supposed to be rulers; those that harnessed good emotions were to 
become soldiers, while those who excelled at neither reason nor good 
emotions were supposed to be slaves. Now, let us fast forward to the 17th 
Century and look at the dawn of the Enlightenment. With the light of reason 
dimmed during the Dark/Middle-Ages when philosophy sank even lower than 
being a handmaid to theology, it was understandable for Descartes to declare 
philosophical doubt as the starting point of a new philosophy. In The 
Meditations Descartes has said about himself that he decided to doubt the 





existence and truth of everything received or handed down – this practice is 
what in phenomenology is called performing an epoché, a bracketing out. But 
he discovered that at least he could not doubt the existence of the doubting self 
itself and so proceeded to analyse the ontology of this doubting self and 
posited that it consists of mind and body and all that those two aspects 
entailed, but he then privileged the mind part of the duo which privilege he 
summed up in the postulation “Cogito ergo sum – I think therefore I am”. 
While the classical forerunner to Deascartes is Socrates himself, whose project 
of philosophical doubt and questioning of an uncritical subscription to 
tradition led to his being condemned to death by the gatekeepers of his 
society, the immediately past forerunner to Descartes was none other than the 
reformist Martin Luther of Germany whose 95 theses revolutionised European 
religious thinking.1 
One of the immediate consequences of the aforesaid supposed ontological gap 
between the Self and the Other as posited by Descartes was that it opened up 
nature not to nurture but to exploitation, and is believed to have significantly 
speeded up the rise of scientific experimentation because now the Other had 
been reduced to an object or a potential instrument – a means to an end and 
not an end in itself as well. The link here is to science, its chief patron being 
the English polymath Francis Bacon who propounded the inductive (by 
elimination) scientific method of investigation. And, to cut a long story short, 
a sociological analysis of the Enlightenment would posit that it led to the 
blooming of the Industrial Revolution (the age of the machine, a mechanistic 
civilisation; the ghost in the machine) which then led to the rise of Global 
Capitalism which in turn – due to the search for raw materials, markets and 
cheap labour – led to slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism. In all these set 
ups the Other is reduced to a thing and a commodity (“thingfication” and 
“commodification”). Some have also linked the rise of Cartesian ontology to 
the emergence of some virulent forms of patriarchy and ecological violence, 
the latter which has resulted into what we commonly know as climate change. 
                                                          
1 Despite his revolutionary religious thinking, Martin Luther’s legacy is mixed 
because he is also on record to have advocated for the persecution of German Jewry, a 







What is apparent, if not more than apparent, is that this reduction of the Other 
into an instrument, utilitarian that the enterprise was, marked the 
corresponding gap between scientific development and moral development. 
Indeed, in a scientific and individualistic age, sometimes we are tempted into 
thinking that being ethical towards our Others is optional, or a matter of 
charity or generosity. The postulations in the theory I will bring to you should 
make us think again because it seems that being ethical is in fact an 
ontological obligation/duty and not a question of mere personal whim. 
The Self and the Other 
Critical responses to the problems of subjectivity and the power relations 
attendant on constructions of subjectivity in colonial/postcolonial, gender and 
ecological literature have emanated from various schools of thought, most 
notably psychoanalysis. The standard vocabulary here tends to revolve around 
issues of Selfhood and Otherness. The Self is the mind, that self-determining 
and self-sufficient autonomous Subject of the Cartesian cogito, and the Other 
is the body, woman, the racialised/colonized or environment/insensate matter. 
Even though the conception of a Self who is all mind is often regarded as a 
given, the Other has received considerable attention and, in the process, has 
thrown some light on the nature of the supposedly autonomous Self.  
Some psychoanalytic approaches conceive of the Other as a projection of “the 
darker side of the Self,” which acts as its counter, and could be demoniacal 
even (see, for example, Said, 1978; JanMahomed, 1985; and Kristeva, 1991). 
Such approaches view the Self’s construction in relation to the Other as 
specular but in a disfigured way. Another conception of the Other (especially 
the colonized Other) is that of a being ravaged by a split-consciousness 
through desiring to be in the places of both the coloniser and the colonised 
(see, for example, Memmi, 1991; Fanon, 1961 and 1968; and Bhabha, 1990 
and 1994). Still other conceptions of the Other involve the vagaries of 
mimicry, with its attendant (and unsettling) menace, a process through which 
the Other is encouraged to imitate the colonial or dominating Self, but in the 
eyes of such a Self only ends up as a disfigured Self; that is, the Other 
becomes “like the Self, but not quite” (see, for example, Bhabha, 1994). Then 
there is the exploration of the potentials of cultural hybridity in which Self and 
Other are deemed to begin to merge, but in a relationship in which the Self 





does not acknowledge its own Otherness (see, for example, Bhabha, 1990). 
My paper seeks to contribute to this debate from an angle that interrogates the 
Cartesian binary or dichotomous logic of “either Self or Other”, and focuses 
on the intimations in his writing of a logic of “both/and” or “and-or” (see 
Waugh, 1992a: 163-164) that an embodied conception of consciousness as 
propagated by the physicalist philosophy of mind affords.  
In this regard, as various post-colonial theorists, such as Peter Childs and 
Patrick Williams (1997) in An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory  and Bill 
Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin (1989) in both The Empire Writes 
Back  and the various theorists they gather together in The Postcolonial 
Studies Reader (1995),  contend, it is common knowledge that the ultimate 
aim of the explorations by these various post-colonial scholars is to expose, 
undermine and invalidate the bases upon which discriminatory and 
exploitative relations (colonial, gender, ecological, etc.) are founded. Among 
other proposals for the invalidation of the imperialist drive have been those 
approaches that deal with multiculturalism such as those advanced by theorists 
such as Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy; and those that propose a transcendence of 
the traditional identity boundaries by questioning the very bases of existential 
boundaries such as those by Hommi Bhabha and, to some extent, Kwame 
Anthony Appiah. My own purpose in this paper is to question the ontological 
bases (by which is meant those to do with the ontology of consciousness itself) 
of discrimination and the attendant exploitation.  
As I have hinted at above, what I propose is an understanding of an embodied 
subjectivity that is in keeping with physicalist conceptions of consciousness. 
For the physicalists, the mind must be with the rest of the body and be of it for 
it to escape the fate ─ one born of Cartesian illusion ─ of existing as “a pea 
rattling around in a shell” (see J.M. Coetzee, 1999), countering 
consciousness’s supposed alienation from the natural world, thereby.  Such a 
physicalist or embodied view of consciousness as posited here also lends 
credence to the standard objection, as that advanced by Patricia Waugh (1992: 
134), to Cartesianism’s “fetishization of pure reason as the locus of 
subjecthood”.2 
                                                          
2 Waugh (1992: 134) notes as follows regarding this intersubjective consciousness: 






Additionally, among others, Theodor Adorno, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jurgen 
Habermas and Patricia Waugh could be said to be proposing that we not 
abandon reason altogether, but rather that we revise and redefine 
Enlightenment’s concepts of reason and subjectivity. Indeed, most socially 
conscious philosophers will find intellectually problematic those wholesale 
attacks on philosophy as a discipline that do not discriminate between the 
various schools of thought within it; those that do not isolate those schools of 
thought that could be useful from those that are destructive and possibly 
illusory. In this revisionist project, Waugh (1992: 134) especially, also points 
to the existence of a rationality that admits of both intersubjectivity and also 
the lack of absolute intersubjectivity between the Self and the Other. The 
present paper argues that there is space within rational argumentation to 
account for a conception of consciousness as embodied. My view, in this 
paper, is that these revisionists want us to develop what Adorno has called an 
“affective” conception of reason, a kind of reason that, as part and parcel of an 
embodied subjectivity, will be able to feel, first and foremost, but, beyond 
that, it should be the type of reason that, realising its lack of autonomy, will 
come to acknowledge its own indebtedness to sources of its content, at the 
same time that it feels itself implicated in the Other’s subjectivity, doubling its 
lack of autonomy thereby. 
Having teamed up with the neurosciences, the physicalist strain within the 
philosophy of mind has posed the most formidable challenge to Cartesian 
binaric ontology. I want to expound the tenets of physicalism and then move 
                                                                                                                                           
self is both constant and fluid, ever in exchange, ever re-describing itself through its 
encounters with others. It seems to be this recognition of mediation as that which 
renders total self-determination impossible which so many male modernists and 
postmodernist writers find unacceptable”. But even on such a view, self-determination 
is possible because ultimately it is the Subject who organises the material so 
encountered and apprehended. Waugh (1992: 164) further points out, in this regard, 
that “perhaps the most positive lesson of Postmodernism is that to see existence in 
terms of such an aesthetic model may be to recognise that “autonomy” can still be 
achieved but in ways which do not necessarily assert self by annihilating other”. In my 
paper I am trying to demonstrate how this kind of subjectivity as gestured towards by 
someone like Waugh here would be like in ontologically demonstrable terms. 
 





on from there to postulate a physicalist philosophical system that 
demonstrably takes Descartes to task. Physicalism posits that the mind is a 
physical entity. From this postulation I have worked out a philosophical 
system whose central tenets revolve around the unitariness and relationalness 
of subjectivity characterised by consciousness’s embodiedness, intentionality 
and inter-subjectivity.  
The system starts with the nature of consciousness as a basis:  It is commonly 
understood within philosophical circles that the building blocks of 
consciousness are concepts: that consciousness is constituted by concepts. A 
concept is a two part entity consisting of form and content. While form is 
innate to the individual, consisting of both structure and possibility, content is 
not sui generis and not obtained ex nihilo; rather, it is externally derived as 
the subject interacts with its Others and that is where Descartes comes in for 
some chastising. At this point let me throw a challenge at you: Can any of you 
tell us which concept you have whose content was generated from your own 
resources without contact with your Others? 
Since physicalism contends that the mind is physical, by which is meant 
embodied, consciousness, too, must be an embodied entity. If consciousness is 
constituted by concepts its content must also be physical. So the argument is 
that the mind exists on a continuum with the body; that in fact the entire body 
is mind: mind suffuses or is constituted by the entire body – herein comes 
Theordo Adorno’s concept of Subject-Object relations as he urges for 
“nonviolent felt contact with one’s others” (1944 ), or Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological concept of the Body-Subject (1962 & 1968).  
From the embodied epistemological considerations in the framework 
developed in this paper, I can say, following Kant especially, that, 
ontologically, the appearances or representations are the link between the Self 
and the Other and, indirectly, also with the other-in-himself/herself/itself from 
whom the appearances as intuited representations necessarily issue. The 
question is: Is it possible for there to be a radical (that is, absolute) gap 
between appearances and the things that are represented by those 
appearances? Can appearances be totally unconnected to that from which they 
derive? Surely, even the shadow on the wall of Plato’s cave will reflect some 






will not, unless another medium intervenes ─ which intervention would then 
act as an explanation of the change so effected ─ cast a rectangular shadow on 
the wall. This aspect, in addition to constituting the content part of the 
Subject’s consciousness, in itself provides a link, even if tenuous (because 
mediated), between the Subject and that from which the appearances emanate. 
Though a constructivist to the core, Kant (1929) himself admits the existence 
of this link through his acknowledgement of the existence of “objective” or 
“brute” reality, although he bemoans the fact that we cannot know such 
objective reality-in-itself. He notes that without objective reality there would 
be no appearances or else “we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that 
there can be appearances without anything that appears” (27). Indeed, if the 
content of a Subject’s consciousness is derived from sources external to him 
or her it means that the Subject is not just contiguous with those external 
sources but he or she is in fact co-terminal with them.  
As further proof of this co-terminousness between a Subject and his Others is 
an aspect of consciousness that is technically known as “intentionality” which 
means consciousness’s aboutness or directedness. In other words, the reach of 
consciousness is always about something or directed towards something both 
in terms of its sources and its imaginative properties. It is this aspect, more 
than anything else, which connects the subject to its others; which 
demonstrates the connection between the Subject and his or her Others.  The 
subject then is both ontologically indebted (as to the content of his or her 
consciousness) as well as inseparably connected to its others (as to the 
operations of the intentionality of consciousness) and so all talk of the validity 
of individualism or physical alienation - whether from oneself or one’s others 
or the environment - is actually a figment of the imagination. Postulations 
such as John Mbiti’s construction of an African ontology as “I am because we 
are and since we are therefore I am” (1975) are closer to how things are on the 
ground than the disembodied and divisive Cartesian formulation of ‘I think 
therefore I am”, especially since Descartes hubristically believes that the 
content of his thoughts is sui generis and obtained ex nihilo.  Of course the 
Other becomes a part of the self as a phenomenon (a representation) and not 
as a noumenon  which fact preserves our individuality, the irreducibility of 
our consciousness and which also constitutes the quale/qualia of our concepts 
and individual consciousnesses. 





The admission by Kant above has at least two important consequences: firstly, 
the argument that there cannot be appearances without anything that appears 
gives pride of place to the existence of objective reality in its own right, 
independent of any constituting Subject. The second consequence is that we 
derive our material knowledge from appearances which represent something, 
even if we cannot and, indeed, need not, apprehend that something-in-itself, it 
being the preserve of the Other, its irreducible otherness. These points are 
cogent enough to dismiss the possibility of the autonomous Subject of 
Descartes and lay the foundations instead for the possibility of the overcoming 
of the schism between a Self and its Others while preserving as “sacrosanct” 
the otherness of our Others.  
The above set up renders the link between the mind and the appearances that 
constitute the content of its concepts organically co-extensive, as I have 
pointed out, not just by way of being contiguous but by being coterminous and 
“inter-subjective”, while remaining individuated and subjective, because 
mediated. Of course, these appearances which constitute the content of 
concepts are mediated through the Self, that is, from the Self’s point of view, 
from its embodied cognitive apparatus. But, that said, without these 
appearances the Self would not know the Other at all and also not know itself, 
that is, it would not be a conscious Self in the first instance. To the extent that 
the Self is involved in an embodied epistemological or cognitive relation with 
any Other, that Other (even if it is only at the level of the appearances) to the 
same extent, becomes an integral part of the Self. And, reciprocally, the same 
situation obtains for the Other Subject. The Self, then, is not alienated from 
the Other nor is the Other from the Self. The Self is “the Self-in-and-with-the-
Other” and the Other is the “Other-in-and-with-the-Self”. This is the case for 
both because the content of their consciousness is constituted by material from 
each other which renders each dependent on the other for the source of the 
content of its consciousness, and thereby interdependent rather than 
autonomous. All the relevant notions of intersubjectivity (such as those we 
find in the Ubuntu philosophy and other kindred or cognate philosophies) and 
those of hybridity, liminality or the rhizomic (such as those of Homi Bhabha, 
Paul Gilroy, Stewart Hall, Kwame Anthony Appiah and others) converge here 






Ethics of an embodied, “intersubjective”, Self-Other subjectivity. 
What kind of Ethics can we derive from the above Ontology-cum-
Epistemology? From the preceding argumentation and demonstration, it 
should be clear that the need for an embodied Self-Other Subject to be ethical 
towards its Others – whether that Other be a fellow human being, an animal, a 
tree or a stone – is not, at the barest minimum, a question of charity or 
generosity; rather it is a fundamental requirement of the embodied Self-Other 
Subject’s very ontology of its embodied and intersubjective consciousness.3 
On my model, being ethical towards the Other is a question of the embodied 
Self-Other Subject’s validation of herself or himself and acknowledgement of 
his or her Others that are an integral part of his or her consciousness while 
taking into account their otherness. In short, the cornerstone of the embodied 
Self-Other ethics is an act of Self and Other-validation, through an 
acknowledgement of one’s ontological indebtedness to one’s Others and 
implication in their consciousness.  
If it can be demonstrated that the embodied Self contains within it aspects of 
the Other, that alone could do more than all the sermonising about what 
ethical conduct ought to be. Talk of love, sympathy or empathy remains empty 
where the rationale for such phenomena is not provided. In fact most humans 
are very sceptical about the validity of the aforesaid phenomena due to their 
being prone to sleight of hand or fallacious application as in emotional arm-
twisting, or in the appeal to pity (argumentum ad misericordiam).4 In my 
                                                          
3 Generosity starts from a point where the Self-Other knowingly reaches out to the 
other Self-Other more than she or he is indebted to that Self-Other and that is not 
always a positive step because in some cases it becomes a case of patronage. But the 
concept “charity” has such negative connotations that I prefer to avoid it and opt for 
the concept “generosity”. When the Subject knowingly reaches out to the Other less 
than he or she owes the Other, it is called meanness and shows a defect in that 
Subject’s conception of indebtedness. 
4 Kant’s ethics of duty, especially his categorical imperative, coupled with his 
“kingdom of ends”, points towards a Self-Other ethics but it does not provide a 
rationale that would bind one to apply them to oneself on clearly rational grounds. The 
appeal to duty, unless properly motivated or accounted for, can very easily lend itself 
to a charge of ‘charity’, where the other is not within the self but wholly exteriorised. 
If duty arises from one’s acknowledgement of one’s ontological indebtedness to the 





theory I try to strip these phenomena of their ontological mystique and present 
them as they could be like and so save them from the appeal to pity or 
sentiments. Sentiments come in only depending on the value that the Subject 
attaches to the Other whose aspects have become an integral part of himself in 
the overall Self-Other subjectivity.  
The failure to acknowledge one’s ontological debt towards Others could be 
wilful or out of ignorance. If it is out of ignorance the subject could be said to 
be suffering from ontological blindness and if wilful, the subject could be said 
to be guilty of ontological thievery: so you are either ontologically blind or an 
ontological thief. No problem with being ontologically blind as it is usually 
not by conscious choice and blindness can be cured but if your ignorance is 
wilful there is a more serious problem. Either way relational problems ensue 
as a consequence of the un-acknowledgement of one’s ontological debt to 
one’s Others. Examine any case of conflict with or exploitation of the Others 
and what will emerge is that either one or both of the subjects involved did not 
calculate very well what their ontological debt and hence obligation was 
towards the Other or they failed to take into account the otherness (the 
noumenon) of the Other. Of course, there is also the question of the place and 
role of the imagination in ethics to account for ethical acts that go beyond the 
call of ontological indebtedness to one’s others (such as in altruism) or of 
being ethical towards one’s others despite oneself (such as in tolerance).  
While the embodied Self-Other Subject is her or his own ethical standard, it so 
happens that she or he really has no choice but to be ethical towards other 
embodied Self-Other Subjects. For the embodied Self-Other Subject, ethics is 
not charity, it is a matter of her or his own validation and that of Others, and 
the price of being unethical is high: the price is a kind of schizophrenia – a 
split Self-Other subjectivity, that is, the Self-Other Subject divided against its 
embodied Self-Other subjectivity. This makes sense of Patricia Waugh’s 
(1992: 121) contention that the Self cannot destroy the Other without at the 
                                                                                                                                           
Other Subject it is appropriate. As I have noted above, unlike an attitude of generosity, 
an attitude of charity is not only patronising, it is also ontologically mistaken as it 
connotes an autonomous Subject performing a benevolent act on and for the Other; I 







same time doing violence to itself: “[t]he destruction of the other […] cannot 
be accomplished without an accompanying effect of fragmentation of the 
self”. In the same connection, in an essay titled “Africa Within Us”, Douglass 
Livingstone (1976), paints an even more graphic picture of such Other and 
Self destruction for those who try to deny or get rid of the Other part of 
themselves: 
A living body is of course subject to certain immutable laws. A 
body divided against itself, as someone I’m sure said, dies – as in 
various types of cancer for instance, where some cells, not 
content with their orderly dissimilarities yet underlying unity of 
purpose with the blokes over the road, differ yet again from their 
associates, and in trying to impose their ways on the others, 
destroy the whole world they occupy. Dying too in the process, of 
course: the inexorable final goal of which they are no doubt 
mindlessly aware while the heady process of Antigone-like 
resurrection ensues. (qtd. by Brown, 2002: 97) 
The point here is that each time the embodied Self-Other Subject fails to 
acknowledge the Other in its own constitution of subjectivity it suffers a kind 
of “small death” or ontological stuntedness or deformity, in that area and if 
such rejection becomes a tendency the web of “small deaths” leads to an 
absolute ontological short-circuit as is the case with the misanthrope (such as a 
pre-meditated or serial murderer) or, more generally, the psychopath – which 
refers to the death of conscience, that ability to recognise oneself in the Other 
and the Other in oneself. 
What needs to be borne in mind, though, is that the Subject is not just in a 
relation of indebtedness to the other embodied Self-Other Subjects; the 
embodied Self-Other Subject is also ontologically owed by them. The 
embodied Self-Other Subject stands in a relation of both responsibilities 
towards, and rights from, the other embodied Self-Other Subjects. Since I 
have observed that the notion of the “autonomous subject” is ontologically 
illusory, the embodied Self-Other Subject has a right to demand that it be 
recognized and acknowledged by the other embodied Self-Other Subject 
because it is owed a debt of having ontologically contributed towards the 
latter’s embodied Self-Other subjectivity. In that regard, it is quite possible 





that even a Self-Other who entertained the illusion of being an “autonomous” 
and “disembodied” Subject would doubt himself or herself if there was no 
validation whatsoever of his/her being in some way. 
While the Self-Other Subject is his or her own ethical standard, a group of 
Self-Others can, by provisional consensus, determine how a Subject could 
understand his or her ontological indebtedness to the group and what modes of 
action are expected from a specific Subject in acknowledgement of such a 
debt ─ the dialogic imagination comes in here. Ultimately, though, it is left to 
the individual Subject to work out the specifics of her or his own ontological 
indebtedness. In this sense, ethical conduct, all of ethics, revolves around the 
Self-Other approximating a balance between what and how much she or he 
ontologically owes and what and how much she or he is owed.  
To reiterate the point, ethics cannot be prescribed for the Subject. All that 
Others can do is simply make promptings and press on the Subject claims of 
being owed. Such claims are important to enable the Subject properly assess 
its closest “approximate” indebtedness. “Approximate” because no Self-Other 
Subject can properly repay its ontological debt because, due to the otherness 
of the Other as well as its own otherness, there will always be something over 
and above what the Subject can both know and, in turn, do based on such 
mediated and impartial knowledge of both its Self-Otherness and of the Other. 
But the other Self-Other Subject can also be either generous or mean towards 
the Self-Other Subject; generous when, out of choice, she or he does not press 
claims for what she or he is convinced is owed by the Subject or gives out 
more than he or she owes, and mean when he or she demands more than she or 
he knows is due to her or him. Ultimately, though, each Subject has to work 
out his or her own “golden mean”. 
In place of the Hegelian Master-Slave paradigm which is adversarial and 
characterised by acrimony, the relation adumbrated here is closer to Paulo 
Freire’s (1971) Subject-Subject relation, which is most likely a reworking of 
Hegel’s Master-Slave paradigm. Freire insists (regarding intersubjectivity) on 
the difference between the dialogical and anti-dialogical human relationships: 
The dialogical theory of action does not involve a Subject, who 






there are Subjects who meet to name the world in order to 
transform it. If at a certain historical moment the oppressed […] 
are unable to fulfil their vocation as Subjects, the posing of their 
very oppression as a problem (which always involves some form 
of action) will help them achieve this vocation. (1971: 148) 
All in all, my personal point of view is that, whatever its uncertainties, 
possible dangers and the trauma that is attendant on the process, the encounter 
between the Self and its Others (beyond the basic and unavoidable stage of 
initial encounter) is a risk worth taking. This is because, for the most part, the 
more any Subject encounters the Other the more rounded Self-Other Subject 
he or she becomes, contributing to the Other as much as gaining from her/him 
in the exchange and thereby expanding his or her ontological horizon. Each 
encounter is potentially both an imprisoning and, paradoxical though it 
sounds, liberatory “prison house”. Either way, to know is not to master the 
Other, but to be indebted to him/her/it. So, ultimately then, knowledge is 
indeed power but not in the traditional Baconian or Foucauldian sense of the 
knower mastering and potentially imposing himself on the known (see 
Nethersole 2005: 256). Rather, knowledge entails an expansion of one’s 
ontological horizon but which involves indebtedness to one’s Others and a due 
acknowledgement of this indebtedness would benefit both the knower and the 
known, reciprocally. It is when acknowledgement of this indebtedness is 
ignored that the Subject becomes a force in its own right ─ often, a force for 
destruction.  
Via epistemology, then, the ontology adumbrated in this paper has led us on to 
an ethics, a Self-Other ethics. Such an ethics posits that it is failure to 
acknowledge one’s ontological debt and one’s connectedness to one’s Others 
that lead to relational problems between one subject and its Others, both on an 
inter-personal and inter-group levels. What happens during what is known as 
the encounter – and subsequent encounters – as the case may be – is what 
seals our ethical indebtedness. Indeed, I daresay that if each one of us 
acknowledged our ontological indebtedness and our connection to our Others, 





and also took into account their noumenon, that would make for smoother, 
better-oiled global polity in the twenty-first, of all centuries – and beyond. 5 
Conclusion 
As we have noted in this paper, the scholarly mixing of natural or physical 
science and speculative philosophy can be seen in Aristotelian philosophising 
and “scienticising”. It is evident that Aristotle saw no contradiction in this 
approach – which is as it should be. At the time of the Enlightenment, 
Descartes himself, besides being a mathematician of note, was an amateur 
scientist in his own right who is famously said to have once observed the 
dissection of a human cadaver – if only to look for the point at which the mind 
and the body meet. Descartes’ English counterpart, Francis Bacon, supplied 
the hard science angle to that new age. And, as I have demonstrated in this 
paper, even in our time there are, increasingly, very fruitful alliances being 
forged between speculative philosophy and hard science, especially in the 
field of Philosophy of Mind, some of whose approaches tap from the 
neurosciences to lend credence to long-held suppositions in the philosophical 
study of consciousness. Further, there are close links between fiction and 
science in a literary genre called sci-fi. The mixing of art and science in 
practices such as video gaming and cartooning is also vibrant and 
demonstrates this indissoluble union between the sciences and the humanities. 
Further, industry is increasingly tapping into aesthetics to come up with 
products that are not just functional but which are also pleasing to the eye and 
other refined senses. Artistic manifestations in the areas of architecture and the 
                                                          
5 I need to mention that the theory outlined above is, arguably, quite versatile and 
dynamic and its tenets can be applied to a wide range of issues including those of 
gender, ethnicism/tribalism/regionalism, racism and those to do with identity, 
generally. One can also deploy it to provide an ontological basis for rights and duties, 
for another example. To illustrate this assertion one could say that we have DUTIES 
towards others primarily because we are indebted to them ontologically at the level of 
consciousness. At the same time we have RIGHTS both because they, too, owe us an 
ontological debt and also because of the irreducible aspects of our ontogeny, that is 
our noumenon:  the us-in-ourselves. Already I have applied this theory to the fiction 
of the 2003 Nobel Laureate J.M. Coetzee and you can apply it to a wide range of 






built environment are yet another field that attests to this fruitful alliance. All 
these examples expose the supposed gap between the sciences and the 
humanities as only sleight-of-mind and dangerous, and this danger is being 
made manifest in very real ways in the environmental degradation that results 
from humanity’s unethical exploitation of the natural resources putting the 
entire humanity at great risk in a myriad of ways. 
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